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AS GREECE GOES, SO GOES THE E.U.: DEFENDING EUROPE WITH A
SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING FRAMEWORK
Elizabeth H. Dahill*

I. INTRODUCTION
The European sovereign debt crisis has devolved into a complex
whack-a-mole game, confounding expert policymakers, global financial
analysts, and pundits. Each day brings new headlines as the crisis
continues to evolve with no end in sight. Every new development sends a
shockwave through the global financial markets and spreads uncertainty
from large international financial institutions down to average working
men and women. In response to this volatility, European policymakers
gathered in October 2011 at the Euro Summit.1 The meeting concluded
months of posturing and set the framework for a precarious
compromise—the Euro Summit Statement (the Statement): a mix of
bailouts, austerity measures, and haircuts for the banks. Then, in
December, the Euro Summit moved forward with its promises under the
Statement and signed an intergovernmental treaty. The treaty set the
terms for “structural reforms and fiscal consolidation” in order to
enhance E.U. fiscal “monitoring and [to correct] macroeconomic
imbalances.”2
However, this ad hoc solution, the Statement, and the treaty reform
steps, have done little to quell fears.3 Instead, Europe is faced with a new
set of questions: How long can these European Financial Stability
Facility (EFSF) bailout funds last? What role will the non-Eurozone
European Union (E.U.) member states4 play in the current bailout and
future fiscal reforms? Can Greece be saved and will Europe be able to
* Staff Attorney, Seyfarth Shaw LLP. I am grateful for comments from Robert Dremluk,
Esq., Professor Edward Janger of Brooklyn Law School and the participants in the Brooklyn Law
School Bankruptcy and Commercial Law Colloquium.
1
Euro Summit Statement, Euro Summit (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/125644.pdf.
2
Presidency Conclusions, Brussels European Council, (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.consilium.
europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/126714.pdf [hereinafter Conclusions].
3
See Sudeep Reddy, Geithner Presses Europe for Debt Solution, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204770404577082512791508098.html;
Patrick
Donahue, Greek Debt Talks Risk Derailing EU Summit, BLOOMBERG, Jan. 30, 2010,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/print/2012-01-29/greek-debt-talks-risk derailing-eu-summit/ (“The
fact we’re still at the beginning of 2012 talking about Greece is a sign this problem hasn’t been dealt
with.” (quoting George Osborne, U.K. Chancellor of the Exchequer)).
4
The Eurozone is composed of seventeen out of twenty-seven member states of the European
Union who have adopted the euro as their common currency. Introduction, EUR. CENTRAL BANK,
http://www.ecb.int/euro/intro/html/index.en.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2011).
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regroup to save Spain, Italy, and potentially, Portugal—or will the
seventeen nations that joined together to adopt one common currency
dissolve and end the euro experiment?5 Now, the world waits as the
Eurozone member states, and the greater E.U., attempt to address these
concerns and continue to battle this evolving debt beast.6 This
uncertainty is worrisome in an increasingly inter-connected financial
world.7 Therefore, to respond to this crisis and likely, future crises, a
clear framework to efficiently and effectively restructure sovereign debt
is necessary.
The creation of a European framework can accomplish the goal of
restructuring sovereign debt efficiently and effectively.8 The framework
must provide “adequate incentives to ensure the timely and orderly
restructuring of unsustainable sovereign debts.”9 The need for such a
framework is not a recent development.10 Sovereign insolvency and the
need for a restructuring mechanism are issues that have continually faced
sovereign nations and sovereign debt purchasers. Therefore, sovereign
debt scholars and institutional entities have previously proposed
mechanisms to respond to these sovereign debt crises, including: (1) the
International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Sovereign Debt Restructuring
Mechanism (SDRM) and (2) the Collective Action Clauses (CAC). For
the time being, both of these proposals remain fixtures of academic
discussion and debate. The IMF formally removed the SDRM from
consideration, and CACs, while common components in sovereign bond
contacts, have never been used to implement a full-scale restructuring.11
Therefore, these proposals, in addition to the Statement, provide the
foundation from which to frame a new proposal: the creation of a
European Debt Restructuring Framework (EDRF).12
5
Liz Alderman, Banks Build Contingency for Breakup of the Euro, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25,
2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/26/business/global/banks-fear-breakup-of-the-euro-zone
.html?_r=1&hp [hereinafter Alderman, Banks Build Contingency for Breakup of the Euro]; see
Donahue, supra note 3.
6
While not all E.U. member states have agreed to adopt the euro, all E.U. member states are
vulnerable to uncertainty in the euro and have an interest in rebuilding fiscal security in Europe. See
FRANÇOIS GIANVITI ET AL., A EUROPEAN MECHANISM FOR SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS RESOLUTION:
A PROPOSAL 21–23 (Andrew Fielding ed., 2010) [hereinafter GIANVITI].
7
GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 3 (noting that the ad hoc solutions are incomplete and fail to
provide a framework to address “future debt crises in the euro area”).
8
See GIANVITI, supra note 6, at vi (“As French XVIIth-century churchman and occasional
conspirator Cardinal de Retz used to say, ‘one leaves the realm of ambiguity at one’s peril.’”).
9
ANNE O. KRUEGER, A NEW APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING v (2002),
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/exrp/sdrm/eng/sdrm.pdf.
10
Id.
11
See Part II, A & B infra. But see Landon Thomas Jr., Next Time, Green May Need New
Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/10/business/global/greecedebt-restructuring-deal-private-lenders.html?hp=&pagewanted=print [hereinafter Thomas, Greece
May Need New Tactics] (noting the Greek’s recent use of collective action clauses to force creditors
to support a new debt relief plan).
12
In order to address the full scope of a sovereign’s debt burden, a restructuring, not a
rescheduling, is required. In a rescheduling parties agree to amend the “timetable of repayments
without changing their present value.” GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 4 n.1. Whereas a restructuring
involves:
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In response to the growing sovereign debt crisis, E.U. policymakers
should revive the SDRM, addressing the problems that led to its failure
and adapting its successful elements, to create the EDRF. The IMF’s
premier international economists worked to develop the SDRM.13 Even
though the SDRM ultimately failed to gain international support, the
mechanism provides a useful foundation for drafters writing a new
framework tailored to the E.U.’s needs. This framework would allow a
sovereign-debtor and its creditors to initiate and conduct negotiations for
orderly debt restructuring and the efficient administration of the debtor
and creditor interests.14 In addition, it would alleviate the growing burden
on debtor nations, while also protecting (or at least addressing) the other
E.U. member states and European nationals’ interests.
Part II will outline the history of sovereign debt and its reoccurring
crises and discuss previous proposals to curb these crises, specifically the
SDRM and CACs. Part III will address the current crisis in Europe, most
specifically, the debt crisis in Greece and the Euro Summit’s ad hoc
response. Part IV will argue for the creation of a new restructuring
framework, EDRF, allowing for the orderly and efficient restructuring of
sovereign debt. Finally, Part V will address potential criticisms of the
EDRF and argue that despite these concerns, the EDRF is the most
efficient and effective response to sovereign debt restructuring because it
can protect the interests of the sovereign-debtor, its creditors, and its
citizens.
II. A HISTORY OF CRISIS & FAILED SOLUTIONS
Countries issue sovereign bonds in order to raise capital. The terms of
the bond contract define the rights and obligations of the bond issuer (the
sovereign nation) and the bond purchaser (the creditor).15 If a country
becomes overleveraged and undercapitalized, it may be either unwilling
or unable to continue payment to bondholding creditors. When
sovereigns default on this contractual agreement, a sovereign debt crisis
may ensue.16

a combination of fiscal adjustments by the defaulting government on the
one hand and, on the other, cutting the amount of debt outstanding, prolonging
the maturity of the remaining debt and reducing the interest paid on it. Its
main purpose is to return the debtor-country back to a state of sustainable
public finances. At the same time, it aims at a fair distribution of the cost of
restructuring between the borrower and the creditors.
Id. at 10.
13
KRUEGER, supra note 9, at v.
14
See, e.g., GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 4.
15
MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION:
BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT DESIGN (forthcoming Dec. 2012).
16
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS COMM. ON THE GLOBAL FIN. SYS. STUDY GROUP, CGFS
PAPERS NO. 43: THE IMPACT OF SOVEREIGN CREDIT RISK ON BANK FUNDING CONDITIONS 1–2
(2011).
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Sovereign debt crises have occurred more frequently in the past few
decades. In the 1980s, Mexico was the harbinger of a debt crisis that
spread throughout Latin America.17 In the 1990s, “excessive
indebtedness fuel[ed] excessive consumption,” leading to a crisis in East
Asia.18 Most recently, Argentina, Ecuador, Pakistan, Ukraine, and
Uruguay have all faced economic crises requiring them to restructure
their sovereign bonds.19
In response to these crises, sovereign debt scholars and institutions,
such as the IMF, decided to develop a framework for the orderly
restructuring of sovereign debt.20 The two solutions that emerged from
this scholarship are the SDRM and CAC proposals. Neither proposal has
been subsequently adopted—In 2003, the IMF formally removed SDRM
from consideration, while CACs are now a common clause in bond
contracts, but have never been used collectively to affect a full-scale
restructuring.21 While these proposals are not adequate solutions, they
provide a useful foundation for the development of a new European
framework for restructuring sovereign debt.
A. The IMF’s Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism
After the sovereign debt crises in Latin America, when the IMF was
forced to assume the role of “the lender of last resort,”22 a team of
economists at the IMF, led by Anne O. Krueger, drafted the SDRM.23
The central goal was to “facilitate the orderly, predictable and rapid
restructuring of unsustainable sovereign debt, while protecting asset

17

Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Greek Debt: The Endgame Scenarios, 10 Duke Law
Faculty Scholarship, Paper No. 2380 (Apr. 18, 2011), available at http://scholarship.
law.duke.edu/faculty_scholarship/2380 (“In August of 1982, Mexico was forced to declare a
moratorium on the repayment of its external debt owed to commercial banks. Over the course of the
next two years, more than twenty other countries followed suit—it later came to be called “the
global debt crisis” of the 1980s.”); Ross P. Buckley, The Bankruptcy of Nations: An Idea Whose
Time Has Come, 43 INT’L LAW. 1190, 1194–96 (noting the “severe crisis” in Argentina).
18
Buckley, supra note 17, at 1194 (noting the East Asia crisis from 1996 through 1998 spread
across Malaysia, Korea, Indonesia, Thailand and the Philippines); see also Lee C. Buchheit, A
Quarter Century of Sovereign Debt Management: An Overview, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 637, 639 (2004)
[hereinafter Buchheit, An Overview] (“Since 1982, not a single year has passed without sovereign
debt issues occupying a prominent place in the headlines . . . .The time has now come when some of
those borrowers will have to master the technique of restructuring those securities.”).
19
See Buchheit, An Overview, supra note 18, at 638.
20
KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 39 (“Sovereigns with unsustainable debts often wait too long
before they seek a restructuring, leaving both their citizens and their creditors worse off. And when
sovereigns finally do opt for restructuring, the process is more protracted than it needs to be and less
predictable than creditors would like.”).
21
See infra notes 35, 48–62.
22
See Jeffrey D. Sachs, Director of the Harvard Center for International Development,
Remarks delivered at a conference: The International Lender of Last Resort: What are the
Alternatives?, 181, available at http://www.earth.columbia.edu/sitefiles/file/Sachs%20Writing
/1999/FedResBankofBoston_InternationalLenderofLastResort_June1999.pdf (last visited Oct.29,
2012).
23
KRUEGER, supra note 9, at v, 4.
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values and creditors’ rights.”24 Therefore, SDRM allows a sovereign to
exercise an option to restructure its debt when “no feasible set of
sustainable macroeconomic policies would enable the debtor to resolve
the immediate crisis and restore medium-term viability.”25 The SDRM
mechanism for restructuring debt can be initiated only by the sovereign;
the IMF and/or creditors cannot impose a sovereign’s debt restructuring
under the SDRM.26
Three main components defined the SDRM plan:
Majority Restructuring: The restructuring plan
could be approved by a vote of a “supermajority of
creditors” whose vote would bind all creditors.27 Here,
the goal was to expedite the plan approval process and
eliminate “distributive litigation.”28
Protect creditor interests with “adequate
assurances”29: For example, the sovereign could not
make payments to non-priority creditors or the sovereign
would agree to “conduct policies in a fashion that
preserves asset values.”30 In order to regulate this
provision, certain transparency requirements would be
established.31
Priority Financing: Creditors would be ranked in
seniority order, and creditors who provide fresh capital
to the sovereign would be awarded most-senior status.32
This would allow the sovereign to continue operating as
a sovereign entity.33
Combining all three principles, the SDRM would have provided a
sovereign with the opportunity to restructure its debt while also
balancing creditors’ interests. Protections, such as the adequate
assurances and priority financing, incentivized creditors to participate in
the restructuring.34 Through the exercise of SDRM, the sovereign-debtor
and its creditors could negotiate a restructuring plan allowing the
24
KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 39; Fail safe: What do German calls for an orderly sovereigndefault scheme mean in practice?, ECONOMIST, Nov. 4, 2010, http://www.economist.com/
node/17414142.
25
KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 4.
26
KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 4.
27
KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 14–15.
28
KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 14–15; see also A Factsheet: Proposals for Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM), INT’L MONETARY FUND [IMF] (Jan. 2003), http://www.imf.org/
external/np/exr/facts/sdrm.htm [hereinafter IMF, Factsheet].
29
KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 16–17.
30
KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 16–17.
31
IMF, Factsheet, supra note 28.
32
KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 17.
33
IMF, Factsheet, supra note 28.
34
To the extent creditors’ rights are not sufficiently protected then “[a] dispute resolution
forum would be established to resolve disputes that may arise during the voting process or when
claims are being verified.” IMF, Factsheet, supra note 28.
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sovereign to continue to function as a nation while also paying off its
debts.
Despite the best efforts of Anne Krueger and the IMF, the SDRM
failed to gain sufficient international support and the proposal was
formally removed from consideration.35 Investors, who may have been
creditors under this structure, feared the SDRM would reduce their
potential payoffs from indebted sovereigns36 and would allow for “ex
post facto modification of their contractual rights under outstanding
bonds.”37 This was considered an unreasonable imposition on a creditor’s
right to repayment under the sovereign bond contract. In addition,
creditors ran the risk that the SDRM may “lead to less demand for their
funds and higher risks for funds they provide.”38 On the other hand,
sovereigns feared that the SDRM would “raise the price of credit due to
the increased ease of restructuring and the corresponding decrease in
bailouts.”39 Additionally, nations feared the SDRM would interfere with
a nation’s right of absolute sovereignty in general, and its sovereign
immunity in particular.40 As a result of these concerns, the SDRM was
quick to attract opponents and slow to garner support. Finally, at the
spring 2003 IMF meeting, the IMF’s governing body decided to drop the
SDRM from future consideration.41
B. Collective Action Clauses
The proposed use of CACs for restructuring debt arose as bondissuing sovereigns, specifically, the Group of Ten,42 responded to
SDRM.43 A CAC is a clause that is included in the bond contract to allow
a set percentage of creditors, usually at least a majority, to bind a
minority of dissenters to a restructuring agreement.44 A CAC can
“facilitate bond restructurings by lowering the threshold for agreement to
a restructuring by bondholders from unanimity to an agreed-upon percent
35

Buckley, supra note 17, at 1213; see also GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 19.
Hal S. Scott, A Bankruptcy Procedure for Sovereign-debtors, HARVARD LAW (9/3/2003 1:44
PM), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/about/pifs/research/10scott.pdf; see also Sergio J.
Galvis & Angel L. Saad, Collective Action Clauses: Recent Progress and Challenges Ahead, 35
GEO. J. INT’L L. 715 (2004).
37
Galvis & Saad, supra note 36, at 715.
38
Scott, supra note 36, at 50.
39
Id.; Robert Gray, Collective Action Clauses: Theory and Practice, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 693,
697–98 (2004). This is an especially large concern for developing nations, who face a higher risk of
default, and yet are most in need of the financial assistance provided by issuing sovereign bonds. See
GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 19.
40
Buckley, supra note 17, at 1213 (citing John B. Taylor, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A
U.S. Perspective (Apr. 2, 2002) (“It appears that the United States opposed the SDRM partly
because it represented an expansion of IMF powers . . . ”)); Gray, supra note 39, at 694–95.
41
Buckley, supra note 17, at 1213.
42
The Group of Ten includes Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States, which “consult and
co-operate on economic, monetary and financial matters.” G10, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS,
http://www.bis.org/list/g10publications/index.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2011).
43
See Gray, supra note 39, at 695.
44
See Gray, supra note 39, at 695–96.
36
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super-majority rule.”45 The threshold percentage of creditors to establish
consent is set by the terms of each particular CAC.46 When creditors
reach the threshold, a restructuring can occur.47 The CAC’s goal is to
ensure that the bargaining tactics of a minority group of holdouts does
not indefinitely frustrate negotiations.48 These clauses had been included
in English law bonds since the nineteenth century.49 However, CACs
only arose in bonds governed by New York law in response to the
SDRM.50 Proponents of this contractual solution argued that CACs
provided the same restructuring relief without the intrusive SDRM
provisions, in particular the requirement of IMF oversight.51 Opponents
argued that including a CAC would send a negative signal to investors.52
In 2003, however, Mexico issued the first CAC in a New York bond
without alarming investors.53 This successful CAC experiment opened
the door for the use of CACs in future bond issuances. As a result, CACs
are now common terms in the majority of sovereign bond issuances—
governed by either English or New York law.54
Even though CACs are now commonplace, the power of the CAC as
a restructuring mechanism is limited. Each CAC defines the ability to
renegotiate the terms of the bond contract for its particular issuance. The
voting majority of creditors, as defined by the CAC, can only agree to a
restructuring that would be binding on all holders of that issue.55 In the
event that a sovereign must engage in a large restructuring of all
sovereign debt bonds, the “CAC approach would require separate
decisions from holders of each individual bond issue.”56 The nation is
faced with an aggregation problem, whereby a nation having sold many
bonds through many different issuances, must invoke the CAC in each
45
Patrick Bolton & Olivier Jeanne, Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role of
a Bankruptcy Regime, (2007), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2007/
wp07192.pdf.
46
GROUP OF TEN, REPORT OF THE G–10 WORKING GROUP ON CONTRACTUAL CLAUSES 2
(2002) [hereinafter G-10 REPORT], http://www.imf.org/external/np/g10/2002/cc.pdf (for bonds
issued under English law the qualified majority is typically set at 75% of bondholders).
47
GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 15, at 36.
48
G-10 REPORT, supra note 46, at 4 (asserting that the majority provision will reduce the risk
that an “organized minority” will “hold up the process that a reasonable majority support[]”); Galvis
& Saad, supra note 36, 714–15.
49
Gray, supra note 39, at 695; see Elmar B. Kock, Collective Action Clauses: The Way
Forward, 35 GEO. J. INT’L L. 665, 667 (2004).
50
Gray, supra note 39, at 695 (adopting CACs in the New York bonds required “convincing
the U.S. investor community that the use of CACs did not represent a threat to their interests.”).
51
Gray, supra note 39, at 695.
52
Gray, supra note 39, at 695.
53
Gray, supra note 39, at 698 (the first “New York-law, SEC-registered bond to include
CACs” was issued by Mexico in February 2003. Mexico “had previously expressed its skepticism
about . . . adopting CACs. This suggested to the market that its move was indeed a measure of its
concern with the threat of the SDRM alternative to its access to capital.”); see also Galvis & Saad,
supra note 36, at 715–16 (“Mexico’s bonds incorporate . . . a ‘majority amendment’ clause
permitting holders of seventy-five percent or more of the total outstanding principal amount of the
bonds to amend ‘reserve matters,’ which include basic payment terms . . . .”).
54
GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 15, at 36; see also Galvis & Saad, supra note 36, at 717–18.
55
G-10 REPORT, supra note 46, at 3.
56
IMF, Factsheet, supra note 28.
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issuance and negotiate with each group of creditors separately.57 As a
result, the CAC’s usefulness on a large-scale is questionable.58 In
addition, unlike the SDRM, “[c]reditors of issues not accepting a
restructuring offer would have the right to pursue their interests in the
courts of the country/state under whose laws the debt instruments were
issued.”59 While creditors are limited in their enforcement options
against sovereign-debtors, the absence of an aggregate action provision
among all CACs,60 or an automatic stay, leaves the sovereign without
any protection in the event creditor litigation is successfully executed.61
For practical purposes, the SDRM and CAC approaches remain
“thought experiments” in the context of a full-scale sovereign debt
restructuring rather than an applicable policy.62 Not only did the IMF
remove the SDRM from consideration, but Europe also responded to the
present crisis by negotiating its own ad hoc response. While the
policymakers are certainly experts in the field, informed about both
proposals, neither proposal was formally invoked in the Statement or the
Treaty. As the European sovereign debt crisis highlights, the absence of a
clear framework for restructuring leads to greater uncertainty, which
fuels the crisis further.
III. ENTERING CRISIS MODE: THE EUROPEAN SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS
A. Sovereign Nations on the Brink
Over the last three years, the E.U. member states have approached
and receded from the precipice of a massive default.63 While Greece and
Italy are the “crises de jour,”64 these are only two nations in the domino
57

See, e.g., GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 15.
David A. Skeel, Review Essay, Can Majority Voting Provisions Do It All?, 52 EMORY L.J.
417, 422 (2003) (“Majority voting provisions may be all the sovereign needs to effect a restructuring
if it has only issued one or two classes of bonds. But the voting strategy is much less attractive if the
sovereign’s borrowings are more elaborate.”).
59
IMF, Factsheet, supra note 28.
60
For more information on aggregate reforms see Galvis & Saad, supra note 36, at 727.
61
Skeel, supra note 58, at 423–24.
62
Skeel, supra note 58, at 424 (arguing that the contractual approach is more appropriately
defined as a thought experiment. Therefore, “we really do need a sovereign debt restructuring
mechanism if we are serious about addressing the sovereign debt crisis.”).
63
Landon Thomas, As Greece Struggles the World Imagines a Default, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/business/global/as-greece-struggles-the-world-imaginesa-default.html?pagewanted=all [hereinafter Thomas, As Greece Struggles]; Steven Erlanger &
Stephen Castle, Europe Agrees to Basics of Plan to Resolve Euro Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/27/world/europe/german-vote-backs-bailout-fund-as-rifts-remainin-talks.html [hereinafter Erlanger & Castle, Europe Agrees to Basics of Plan].
64
Times Topics: Global Recession, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/
timestopics/subjects/e/european_sovereign_debt_crisis/index.html?ref=global (last updated Feb. 13,
2012) [hereinafter Global Recession] (“The debt crisis first surfaced in Greece in October 2009,
when . . . Prime Minister George A. Papandreou announced that his predecessor had disguised the
size of the country’s ballooning deficit . . . . Greece took advantage of this easy money to drive up
borrowing by the country’s consumers and its government, which built up $400 billion in debt.”);
Thomas, As Greece Struggles, supra note 63; Cullen Roche, Five Possible Outcomes for the Euro
Crisis, BUS. INSIDER Sept. 2011.
58
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line of highly leveraged and nearly insolvent European nations—which
also include Ireland, Spain, and Portugal.65 These nations, already known
as the Eurozone’s “weakest economies,”66 ignored the debt limits set by
the Stability and Growth Pact 67 and engaged in practices that led to
“enormous” and likely insurmountable, debt loads.68 The growing crisis
sparked “[a] series of negotiations, bailouts and austerity packages,” but
these measures “failed to stop the slide of investor confidence or to
restore the growth needed to give struggling countries a way out of their
debt traps.”69
As the policymakers “flail[ed] in their efforts to come up with a big
plan, fast, to get to grips with the region's debt crisis,”70 the world
watched in increasing consternation.71 Nationals demonstrated in public
plazas across Europe;72 leading governments were voted out of office—
mainly in response to the harsh and unprecedented austerity measures;73
and markets reacted frequently and wildly to each new report—most
especially, reports regarding the broad exposure of European banks,
which are deeply invested in government bonds.74 Despite this growing
65

Global Recession, supra note 64; see also BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 16, at

1.
66

Global Recession, supra note 64.
The Stability and Growth Pact is an accord signed by each member state of the Eurozone to
set national debt and deficit limits that strive to “maintain budget discipline in order to avoid
excessive deficits.” Stability and Growth Pact and Economic Policy Coordination, EUROPA,
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/economic_and_monetary_affairs/stability_and_growth_pact/
index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2011); Resolution of the European Council on the Stability and
Growth Pact, 1997 O.J. (C 236), available at http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/
economic_and_monetary_affairs/stability_and_growth_pact/l25021_en.htm; see also European
Report, BLOOMBERG LAW, Sept. 9, 2011, www.bloomberglaw.com (“The pact was shown to be
ineffective when the crisis hit, as more than 20 member states were found to be running too-high
budget shortfalls.”).
68
Global Recession, supra note 64 (noting that European leaders were forced to respond to
concerns about Italy and Spain through intervening in the market because many see these countries
as “too big to bail out”).
69
Global Recession, supra note 64.
70
The Plan to Have a Plan: Solving the Euro-zone Crisis, ECONOMIST, Oct. 8, 2011,
http://galenet.galegroup.com/servlet/BCRC?vrsn=unknown&locID=nysl_me_brooklaw&srchtp=adv
&c=1&ste=31&tbst=tsVS&tab=2&RNN=A268890969&docNum=A268890969&bConts=2
[hereinafter The Plan to Have a Plan].
71
In fact, large financial institutions are beginning to lose confidence that the euro will survive
this crisis and are preparing for the worst. Alderman, Banks Build Contingency for Breakup of the
Euro, supra note 5.
72
Global Recession, supra note 64 (“Protests by traditional interest groups like public sector
unions were joined by crowds of young people who camped out in Madrid and Athens in imitation
of the Arab Spring demonstrations.”).
73
Global Recession, supra note 64 (noting that harsh austerity measures have led to the “ouster
of governments in Ireland and Portugal, dragging the government of Greece to the brink and
weakening the ruling party in Spain”); In order to implement the measures adopted in the Statement,
both Greece and Italy removed the ruling government and new leaders are charged with the
responsibility of implementing these new economic reforms. See Guy Dinmore & Giulia Segreti,
Italian Vote Paves the Way for Berlusconi Exit, FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 12, 2011,
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/b4217efa-0d52-11e1-a47c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1dWWCa4aP.
74
Global Recession, supra note 64 (discussing the concerns about bank exposure, which arose
in October of 2011, but remain precarious into December. For example, on December 21, 2011 the
European Central Bank issued “cheap three-year loans” totaling almost a half a trillion euros “as part
of its unprecedented effort to keep credit flowing.”).
67
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volatility, “Europe's progress [was] hampered by the usual mixture of
public bickering and behind-the-scenes brinkmanship.”75 Finally, in
October 2011, the Euro Summit met in Brussels with all eyes and ears
attentively waiting for a deal, for a solution, for any hope that the
policymakers could collectively act to stop the growing crisis in Greece
and contain the problem.76
B. The Euro Summit Statement: Greece’s Bailout Compromise
The Euro Summit, a meeting of fiscal policy leaders from all
seventeen Eurozone member states, agreed to a set of compromises set
forth in the Euro Summit Statement.77 The Summit had two main
objectives: (1) immediate aid to Greece, and (2) prevent the spread of
the crisis, or limit the expansion of the crisis to other “at risk” nations.78
The Statement attempted to accomplish those objectives with the
following:
Greek Provisions
Greece: Will reduce its public debt to GDP ratio to
120% by 2020 and introduce austerity measures to
accomplish this goal; 79
European Banks: Will accept a 50% loss on the face
value of all Greek debt80 and will raise $147 billion in
new capital by the end of June 2011 to protect
themselves against losses on loans to Greece and
Portugal;81
75

The Plan to Have a Plan, supra note 70.
Liz Alderman, Europeans Struggle Towards Debt Solution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/16/business/global/europeans-struggle-toward-debtsolution.html?_r=1&ref=world. To be fair, the U.S. policymakers have been similarly unable to
respond to the debt ceiling debate and reforms therein. While this does not justify the inaction by
either set of policymakers, it does note a common tension between prudent financial reform and
politics (e.g. re-election concerns).
77
See generally Euro Summit Statement, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined..
78
See generally Euro Summit Statement, supra note 1, at 1; Alderman, Europeans Struggle
towards Debt Solution, supra note 76; see Main Results of Euro Summit, Euro Summit (Oct. 26,
2011), http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ 125645.pdf (“These
measures reflect our unwavering determination to overcome together the current difficulties and to
take all the necessary steps towards a deeper economic union commensurate with our monetary
union.”).
79
Euro Summit Statement, supra note 1, at 1; see also Frequently Asked Questions: Greece,
IMF, http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/faq/greecefaqs.htm (last updated Sept. 30, 2011)
[hereinafter FAQ: Greece].
80
Erlanger & Castle, Europe Agrees to Basics of Plan, supra note 63.
81
Erlanger & Castle, Europe Agrees to Basics of Plan, supra note 63 (noting that the $147
billion was set as the target because policymakers believe it is crucial for global confidence that the
banks “increase their holdings of safe assets to 9 percent of their total capital . . . given their large
portfolios of sovereign debt.”); The money should be raised from private sources, “including through
restructuring and conversion of debt to equity instruments.” Euro Summit Statement, supra note 1, at
1; In the event this is not possible then the banks may seek support from national governments, or
the ESFS as a last resort. Id; Banks are also required to constrain distribution of dividends and bonus
payments until the target of 9% is achieved. Id. at 15.
76
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Eurozone member states: Will contribute to the
private sector involvement (PSI) package with up to 30
billion euros;82
IMF: Will provide additional aid to Greece under the
“EU-IMF multiannual program for Greece,” which will
be put in place at the end of 2011, [and] will finance up
to 100 billion euros”;83
All Parties: Will work to develop a strong legislative
package within the E.U. structure to create a better
system of economic governance.84
Long-Term Eurozone Crisis Measures:
Stronger European Financial Stability Facility
(EFSF): Will leverage its 440 billion euro fund 4 or 5
fold to build a 1 trillion euro “‘firewall’ against
contagion from the debt crisis.”85 The leveraging
measure will increase the funds available to countries in
crisis without extending the guarantees already provided
by member states;86
European Nations: Will, if necessary, “provide
guarantees to the banks (the criteria and conditions for
such guarantees will be coordinated at EU level) to
facilitate their access to medium-term funding” in order
to “avoid a credit crunch[;]”87
Member states: Will agree to greater E.U. oversight
and coordination of future fiscal planning in member
state financial decision-making and crisis response
mechanisms.88
82

Main Results of the Euro Summit, supra note 78, at 1.
Main Results of the Euro Summit, supra note 78, at 1; see also FAQ: Greece, supra note 79
(“On May 9, 2010, the IMF's Executive Board approved a three-year SDR 26.4 billion (€30 billion)
Stand-By Arrangement for Greece in support of the authorities’ economic adjustment and
transformation program.”).
84
Main Results of the Euro Summit, supra note 78, at 2 (determining that greater coordination
of fiscal policy will occur at the “EU level” even “before national decisions are taken”).
85
Main Results of the Euro Summit, supra note 78, at 2.
86
Main Results of the Euro Summit, supra note 78, at 2. The Statement is not entirely clear
how the EFSF will be leveraged and if this will, in fact, create a sustainable “firewall.” For a
discussion of the various possibilities see Stephen Fidler, EFSF Leverage: A Rundown on Ways to
Bulk up the Euro Zone’s Bailout Fund, WALL ST. J. (REAL TIME BRUSSELS BLOG) (Sept. 27, 2011,
2:31 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2011/09/27/efsf-leverage-a-rundown; Stephen Fidler, Don’t
Believe New EFSF Number, WALL ST. J. (REAL TIME BRUSSELS BLOG) (Oct. 26, 2011, 8:02 AM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/brussels/2011/10/26/dont-believe-new-efsf-number.
87
Way Out of the Debt Crisis, EUR. COUNCIL, http://www.european-council.europa.eu/homepage/highlights/way-out-of-the-debt-crisis.aspx?lang=en (last visited Dec. 10, 2011).
88
Euro Summit Statement, supra note 1, at 7–9; The implementation of these coordination
mechanisms will require treaty revisions setting forth the steps by which fiscal decisions will be
made and to ensure compliance with and enforcement of these decisions. See id; The first steps of
these treaty revisions were initiated at the Euro Summit held from December 8–9. See Steven
Erlanger & Stephen Castle, German Vision Prevails as Leaders Agree on Fiscal Pact, N.Y. TIMES,
83
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As a cohesive response to the current crisis and a call to action to
assist in debt-alleviation, the Statement has largely met the goals of its
drafters.89 However, as a long-term sovereign debt crisis response
mechanism, the Statement is not effective.90 The Statement is only an ad
hoc response, which relies on all members of the Eurozone to finance an
expensive bailout scheme. Imposing austerity measures while
simultaneously building a “firewall,” the measures are as inconsistent as
they are burdensome. In addition, these commitments impose a heavy
burden on E.U. member states both financially and politically.91 As a
result, the Statement, and the subsequent actions thereto, have tested the
bonds between E.U. states and the euro experiment itself.92 In addition,
the Statement neglects the long history of sovereign debt crises, which
have arisen despite “sound macroeconomic policies.”93 Europe has dealt
with a symptom, but it has failed to address the true problem—the
absence of a clear sovereign debt-restructuring framework. In the event a
European nation fails to uphold its austerity and debt restriction
commitments under the Statement, and/or the future treaty provisions
written to implement the Statement provisions, the European Union will
need an orderly mechanism to address this problem, or, potentially, face
the Union’s demise.94
IV. A CRISIS RELIEF VALVE: THE EUROPEAN DEBT RESTRUCTURING
FRAMEWORK (“EDRF”)
As the global financial leaders grasp at straws to implement the ad
hoc solution set forth in the Statement, a mechanism for debt
restructuring is, and has been, available all along: the SDRM. SDRM
was specifically developed to assist sovereign-debtors.95 Its drafters
included some of the world’s foremost economists.96 Therefore, even
though the IMF formally removed the SDRM from consideration, the
Dec. 9, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/10/business/ global/european-leaders-agree-onfiscal-treaty.html.
89
Euro Summit Statement, supra note 1, at 1.
90
The Statement has failed to elevate the crisis in Greece. Greece has failed to meet its
obligations under the terms of the Statement and has required further bailout money. Donahue, supra
note 3; Thomas, Greece May Need New Tactics, supra note 11; see also Euro Summit Statement,
supra note 1, at 9 (stating that the new structure of fiscal governance through the E.U. will “rely on a
stronger preparatory structure”).
91
Thomas, Greece May Need New Tactics, supra note 11 (“Greece, in essence, has become a
financial ward of Europe. And, because the I.M.F. will probably be reluctant to put in new bailout
money in the coming years, the burden will increasingly fall to Europe, led by Germany, to finance
Greece.”)
92
See Erlanger & Castle, German Vision Prevails, supra note 88.
93
Creating a broad “preparatory structure” is an insufficient response to this reoccurring
problem, which has colossal effects on the global economy. See Buckley, supra note 17, at 1193–94
(quoting Laurence Meyer, Board of Governors of the U.S. Federal Reserve System)(“[S]ound
macroeconomic policies do not preclude crises.”).
94
See Alderman, Banks Build Contingency for Breakup of the Euro, supra note 5.
95
KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 2.
96
See, e.g., KRUEGER, supra note 9, at v.
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mechanism should be revived to serve as a model—allowing
policymakers to adopt the positive elements and reform the negative ones
to accommodate Europe’s particular needs, creating a “new and
improved” EDRF. The EDRF would provide a systematic and
predictable structure for all parties to engage in negotiations and produce
a restructuring plan.97 In light of the current debt crisis and the unique
regional cooperation required by the euro, the E.U. has the opportunity to
build on the principles set forth in the SDRM and to create a viable
framework for sovereign debt restructuring.
A. Building the Framework for Negotiations
Creating a new framework for parties to engage in a structure
negotiation requires both an administrative and a legal infrastructure.
For the administrative component, the EDRF needs a venue with
financial investigative resources and economic experts available to
facilitate the negotiations. The European Court of Auditors (ECA), with
the power and the resources to investigate any persons or organization
using E.U. funds, would serve this function.98 When a crisis presents
itself, the EDRF can function as a division within the ECA dedicated to
administrating EDRF negotiations. These negotiations will operate
within an E.U.-created statutory framework,99 creating predictability and
ensuring equitable treatment of all parties. The framework would be
adopted through an E.U. resolution, which is immediately binding and
non-waivable for all E.U. member states and written into a universal
treaty, which will ideally function to expand the scope of authority
beyond the European Union to reach the global community of sovereign
debt creditors. Together, the administrative and legal infrastructures
create the foundation necessary to build a new structure.
1. Finding a Venue
The ECA with its professional E.U. auditors (Auditors) and access to
tools for comprehensive investigative economic research is the natural
institution to house the EDRF. Including the EDRF within the ECA
would streamline E.U. resources used to support the negotiations and
investigations. The ECA is empowered to investigate the use of E.U.
funds through audits and to provide an annual report on the E.U’s
97
See, e.g., GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 4 (proposing a similar structural reform of SDRM to
create: “A procedure to initiate and conduct negotiations between a sovereign-debtor with
unsustainable debt and its creditors leading to, and enforcing, an agreement on how to reduce the
present value of the debtor’s future obligations in order to reestablish the sustainability of its public
finances.”).
98
European Court of Auditors, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/courtauditors/index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2011). Cf. GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 4 (proposing the use
of the Court of Justice of the European Union as the “natural institution for this purpose”).
99
See Skeel, supra note 58, at 422–24.
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financial status to the European Parliament.100 Therefore, the ECA is the
E.U. administrative body most well informed about the use, and abuse,
of E.U. finances. The Auditors, representing each E.U. member state, are
charged with inspecting “E.U. institutions, member countries and
countries receiving E.U. aid,”101 and “any persons or organization
handling E.U. funds,” whose inspection findings are reported to the
European Commission and the E.U. national governments.102 Therefore,
the Auditors have unique professional and institutional knowledge and
are in the best position to oversee the EDRF. With the approval of the
nation-states, the Auditors would facilitate the progress of negotiations
by ensuring that the framework of rules is observed.
2. Establishing Authority
The statutory framework governing the use of the EDRF would be
passed as an E.U. regulation, a legislative act immediately binding on all
E.U. members.103 A uniform law would compel all E.U. member states,
those that have adopted the euro and those that have not, to recognize the
EDRF and to abide by its provisions. 104 Under the law’s terms, any E.U.
member state would have access to EDRF relief. In return, all member
states, including their corporations and citizens, would be bound through
a non-waivable provision to support the framework’s operation, either as
parties to the negotiation, as creditors, or as financiers of the
restructuring plan (as EFSF guarantors).105 While expanding the scope of
the EDRF beyond the Eurozone will provide a greater body of
participants, the restructuring of a sovereign’s debt will require the
participation of a global community of creditors—some of whom may
fall outside the E.U.’s regulatory authority. Therefore, additional steps
must be taken to bind this global creditor community—international
corporations, financial institutions, hedge funds and/or individual
investors.

100

European Court of Auditors, supra note 98.
European Court of Auditors, supra note 98.
102
European Court of Auditors, supra note 98.
103
This would bind some nations, like the U.K., that are not currently members of the
Eurozone. However, fluctuations in the euro create distress in non-euro nations. It would be to the
benefit of these nations to have a place at the table or involvement in the negotiations. It seems these
nations desire to use their current fiscal position to exert greater control over the E.U. and this
legislation may be one such tool to exert that power. See Euro Crisis Opportunity for UK to Reclaim
Powers, BBC NEWS (Nov. 14, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-15730084; However,
the U.K. has consistently been reluctant to adopt any fiscally restrictive provisions. See e.g., Erlanger
& Castle, German Vision Prevails, supra note 88.
104
See KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 33 (discussing the benefits of creating a statutory scheme
rather than a series of contracts as proposed under the CAC system).
105
About EFSF, EUR. FIN. STABILITY FACILITY, http://www.efsf.europa.eu/about/index.htm
(last visited Dec. 11, 2011) (“EFSF is backed by guarantee commitments from the euro area Member
States for a total of €780 billion and has a lending capacity of €440 billion.”).
101
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In order to compel recognition by the global community of creditors,
a universal treaty should be adopted.106 The treaty’s terms would outline
the process required for the EDRF negotiation and thereby establish the
legitimacy, and ideally the universal recognition, of the EDRF
negotiations and its negotiated plan. The treaty can follow the Model
Law’s format on Cross-Border Insolvency (Model Law) promulgated by
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITL),
which was drafted “to formulate a modern, harmonized and fair
legislative framework to address more effectively instances of crossborder insolvency.”107 Similar to the Model Law, all parties to the treaty
would agree to cooperate, and compel their citizens, both private
individuals and corporations, to cooperate with a pending EDRF
negotiation.108 Once the negotiation is complete and a plan is in place,
the treaty would require “automatic recognition and enforceability” of
the plan in other member states.109 Not only will the treaty ensure all
necessary parties engage in the negotiations, but also, it will prevent
derivative litigation actions and ensure the finality of the restructuring
plan.110
While the treaty provides a convenient vehicle for universal
recognition, there is a potential drawback to this method: requiring
sovereign nations to sign a binding treaty.111 Unlike the SDRM that
failed to gain support from individual nations, the EDRF is a more
palatable option for restructuring, especially in the context of the current
crisis. The treaty will ask nations to honor Europe’s new framework,
essentially a formal agreement to ensure the observance of the customary
international law principle of “comity.”112 This commitment is similar to
that required by the Model Law, which has been adopted into the
statutory laws of eighteen nations, including the United States, the
European Union, Mexico, Australia, and New Zealand.113 It is reasonable
106

KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 33.
U.N. Secretariat, Draft Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Legislative Provision
on Cross-Border Insolvency, Note by the Secretariat, 30th Sess., May 12–30, 1997, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/436 (Apr. 16, 1997); See also Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency of the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law [UNCITRAL], G.A. Res. 52/158, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/52/158 (Jan. 30, 1998), available at http://www.cnudci.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts
/insolvency/1997Model.html [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law].
108
See, e.g., id. pmbl.
109
See, e.g., id. art. 25; see also Council Regulation 44/2001, art. 17(1), Jurisdiction and the
Recognition of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2000 (EC), available at
http://www.guildhallchambers.co.uk/uploads/docs/section9/CrossborderInsolvencyIssues_SPR&GMcPhie.pdf.
110
See, e.g., UNCITRAL Model Law, pmbl; see also KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 15.
111
See GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 32.
112
In the absence of a formal treaty, the principle of comity would require that other nations
respect the laws of the E.U.—here the reach of the EDRF. While this principle may accomplish
many of the same goals as the treaty, the treaty is a more clear and effective compliance tool.
113
The Model Law has been adopted by: Australia, Canada, Columbia, Eritrea, Greece, Japan,
Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, New Zealand, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Serbia,
Slovenia, South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United
States. See Status, UNCITRAL, http://www.cnudci.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/
1997Model_status.html (last visited Nov. 7, 2011).
107
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to conclude that a treaty addressing cross-border restructuring would
attract at least the same number, and hopefully, more, parties as a Model
Law for cross-border insolvency proceedings. Many of the same interests
for cross-border harmonization in administering a debtor’s international
assets and debts are present in both circumstances. In addition, the
present crisis has demonstrated the intensely sensitive and interconnected
nature of the modern global economy.114 Where the SDRM asked for
international support for reform after the crisis in emerging Latin
American and East Asian nations, here the EDRF arises as a response to
a crisis that is shaking the foundations of the Group of Ten. If the EDRF
can return calm to the markets and allow for future growth, then it is not
unreasonable to assume nations will sign its formational treaty.
Even if some or all sovereign parties are reluctant to sign the treaty,
individual creditors have a financial interest in participating in the
negotiations in order to receive some return on their investment. Upon
the conclusion of the negotiations and adoption of a plan, all creditors
and sovereign parties would be bound by the mutually agreed upon
terms. The EDRF terms will ensure the sovereign-debtors are not subject
to subsequent litigation to re-negotiate these terms. This will protect the
plan’s finality and encourage greater participation of all relevant parties.
B. The Rules of Engagement
The EDRF will guide the sovereign-debtor115 and its creditors through
a negotiation with the goal of developing a restructuring plan that is in
the best interests of all parties. The plan will ensure debts are repaid in an
amount and within a timeframe that is reasonable to creditors, but also
protects the potential for future growth and stability of the nation. While
each EDRF negotiation will be tailored to meet the needs of the
particular sovereign-debtor and its creditors, the statutory framework will
set the “rules of engagement.”116 The EDRF rules will begin with a
threshold inquiry. The threshold rules will define “who” may use the
EDRF and obtain relief as a sovereign-debtor. To ensure EDRF
resources are used efficiently and preserve the stability of the market for
sovereign bonds, only eligible debtors should be able to use the resources
of the EDRF and obtain restructuring relief from creditors. The Auditors,
in their administrative role, will oversee this process to ensure the
threshold requirements are met. Once a debtor is accepted into the
EDRF, the rules will define the procedures for the negotiation. The main
114

See GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 32–33; see supra Part III.
Following the principles of Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, which allows
municipalities to declare bankruptcy, the sovereign-debtor would remain in power to use and sell
property or to borrow funds through the pendency of the negotiations. See e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 903,
904; Buckley, supra note 17, at 1205–06 (“Perhaps the most important section of Chapter 9 from the
point of view of its applicability to services is section 904 . . . The debtor can therefore go about its
day-to-day activities and borrow money without recourse to the court.”).
116
The EDRF rules will use Chapter 9 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (“Chapter 9”) as a loose
model. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 109.
115
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principles, following the SDRF model, will include: (1) majority
restructuring, (2) adequate assurances for creditors, and (3) priority
financing.117 Together, these threshold and fundamental protocols will
create a framework for restructuring sovereign debt that provides
efficient and effective relief to sovereign-debtors and ensures the
equitable treatment of creditors.
1. Who is a Sovereign-Debtor?: The Threshold Inquiry
The scope of the EDRF must be clearly defined through a threshold
inquiry. The inquiry will ensure only “sovereign-debtors” have access to
EDRF. Therefore, the first step of the threshold analysis is defining “who
is a sovereign-debtor” with a set of identifiable criteria. Only those
debtors who meet these criteria would be eligible to engage in EDRF
negotiations and obtain relief. As the administrator of the negotiations,
the Auditor will apply the criteria and engage in the threshold inquiry.
The Auditor will ask two questions:
1. Is the potential sovereign-debtor an E.U. member
state?118
2. Has the potential sovereign-debtor previously
attempted to negotiate with creditors in good
faith?119
The first question for the threshold inquiry is whether the potential
debtor is an E.U. member. An eligible debtor must be a sovereign-nation,
who has been accepted as an E.U. member.120 This requirement is
necessary on jurisdictional and financial grounds. First, the EDRF would
be formed pursuant to an E.U. Regulation, which is immediately binding
on all E.U. members. Therefore, each member state would be bound to
accept the EDRF as a legitimate debt relief framework. In addition, the
EDRF would be financed by E.U. funds and supported by the EFSF.
Therefore, it is reasonable to limit the use of this tool to those who
support its existence both in theory and in fiscal reality.
The remaining threshold requirement is that the sovereign-debtor
must attempt to negotiate in good faith with creditors.121 This
requirement partially arises from the CAC approach. The prevalence of
CACs in bond contracts means that nations have the opportunity to
negotiate with creditors in specific bond issuances.122 When the
117

See supra notes 27–33 and accompanying text.
Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 109(41).
119
See 11 U.S.C. § 109(c)(5)(B).
120
For more information on which nations are members of the E.U., which nations have
applied for membership, and the criteria for obtaining membership in the E.U., see Countries,
EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2011).
121
The requirement of negotiating in good faith also arises in Chapter 9. See 11 U.S.C. §
109(c)(4).
122
See supra Part II.B.
118
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sovereign realizes its debts are unserviceable, it must exercise due
diligence and attempt to exercise its CACs and negotiate with creditors.
Only after these negotiations have failed, or individual CAC negotiations
have been clearly insufficient, can the sovereign exercise the EDRF.
The goal of the “prior negotiations” inquiry is to limit the use of
EDRF to only good faith sovereign-debtors. Therefore, the framework
must strike a balance between encouraging sovereigns with
“unsustainable debts to approach its creditors promptly”123 on the one
hand, and limiting the preemptive use of the restructuring framework by
“countries with sustainable debts to suspend payments rather than make
necessary adjustments to their economic policies”124 on the other. In
applying this standard, the Auditors will review the proof of prior
attempts to engage in good faith negotiations. Evidence, at a minimum,
should include an affidavit from the Secretary of Treasury attesting to the
existence of such a meeting, evidence of a drafted “term sheet” for such a
negotiation proposal, or financial reports demonstrating the futility of
individual CAC negotiations. A sovereign-debtor that is an E.U. member
and a good faith debtor under the terms of the EDRF framework will be
able to proceed to negotiate with its creditors and draft a restructuring
plan.
2. Framing the Negotiations
A simple and clear set of provisions will govern the restructuring
negotiations. As originally set forth by the IMF, the predictability of the
framework will be important to protect the stability of global financial
markets and ensure the participation of each party.125 The main
provisions adapted for the SDRM remain applicable in the EDRF
context: (1) majority restructuring; (2) protect creditor interests with
“adequate assurances”; and (3) priority financing.
Majority restructuring, a provision central to both SDRM and CAC
approaches, allows an “affirmative vote of a qualified majority of
creditors to bind a dissenting minority to the terms of a restructuring”
plan.126 This prohibits a minority group of holdout creditors from
preventing a deal or from acting as a “hold out,” attempting to extract
more benefits as a condition of agreeing to the plan.127 Therefore,
majority restructuring creates party equity and preserves the value of the
assets financing the plan.128 Adopting the SDRM statutory framework on
top of the contractual CAC clauses, allows EDRF to overcome the
123

KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 4.
KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 2.
125
KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 4–5.
126
KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 14.
127
See GIANVITI, supra note 6, at 24. The parties may also consider exercising a “most favored
nation” technique, which would allow the hold out creditors to separately negotiate an alternative
plan, adopt the most favorable plan, and share the benefits among all parties.
128
See KRUEGER, supra note 9, at 14.
124
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CAC’s aggregation problem and engage in total debt, rather than just
bond-specific, negotiations. All creditors would be included in the
negotiations, and if necessary would be grouped into committees of likedebt holders, such as bond debt holders, bank claims, and domestic
debt.129 A majority vote of all creditors, or creditors’ committees, would
bind all parties to adopt the restructuring plan.130 The EDRF majority
restructuring would ensure all classes of creditors are at the negotiation
table, which streamlines the negotiations and plan approval process and
eliminates “disruptive litigation” by binding all parties through the
majority vote.131
The EDRF will include adequate assurances to protect creditors’
financial interests and incentivize creditors to engage in the negotiations.
Adequate assurances may include certain promises, such as the
sovereign-debtor will make no payments to “non-priority creditors” or
will “conduct policies in a fashion that preserves asset values” and
certain structural insurances, such as restrictions on future relief through
EDRF.132 However, creditors may fear that the sovereign-debtor will
return to “business as usual” and fail to honor its promises after the plan
has been approved. Therefore, this provision may require additional
negotiations to arrive at an agreed upon set of transparency or leadership
transition measures.
While financial transparency and oversight might approach the
sensitive line of sovereignty, it is not an unreasonable imposition. Unlike
the SDRM, which empowered the IMF to act as the overseer, here the
ECA, an E.U. regional institution with personnel representing each E.U.
member state, is employed for this purpose. At a basic level, it may seem
less invasive, and thereby more palatable for sovereign-debtors, if an
E.U. institution is observing the fiscal policy of an E.U. member state. In
addition, Auditors are already empowered to investigate the use of E.U.
funds.133 Since most EDRF plans will include EFSF financing, the
Auditors would be acting within the scope of their authority under the
ECA. Finally, the parties to the EDRF have the flexibility to define the
level of transparency and depth of Auditor review.134 Therefore, on a
balance sheet basis, the terms can be written to protect the sovereign
129
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interests of the debtor, while also providing an extra layer of
accountability for the creditors.
Finally, a successful restructuring requires new capital to finance ongoing expenses and necessary future expenditures. This funding can
come from two sources: (1) EFSF bailout funding, as currently provided
under the Statement, or (2) creditors. To induce creditors to provide
funds or fresh capital, the EDRF must offer the creditor priority
financing, which ensures senior status in repayment.135 Therefore, all
parties give and take: the sovereign-debtor promises priority financing
and receives fresh capital; the creditor offers new funds and receives
priority repayment. As originally stated in the SDRM proposal, “[i]t is in
the collective interests of private creditors and the sovereign-debtor that
new money be provided in appropriate amounts.”136 Fresh capital allows
the nation to continue to finance the restructuring plan, but also, and
perhaps more importantly, to fulfill its governance obligations and ensure
the availability of its social net for its citizens.137 Priority financing
provides incentives to both parties at the negotiation table and helps
ensure the plan will be effective in the long term.
3. “The Plan”
The purpose of the EDRF is to negotiate a restructuring plan that the
sovereign-debtor and a majority of creditors can agree upon and maintain
through completion. Unlike the acceptance of a Chapter 9 bankruptcy
plan, where the plan must meet criteria set forth in the Bankruptcy Code
and must be approved by the bankruptcy judge,138 here the goal is to
reach a consensus agreement, without court involvement, through the
EDRF structured negotiations. While the EDRF frames the rules for the
negotiations, additional incentives or penalties, i.e., carrot or stick,
measures, may be necessary to encourage parties to engage the
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framework and reach a consensus.139 These components, as seen in the
Euro Summit Statement, will include:
1. New Financing: Debtor access to bailout funds from the
EFSF and availability of priority financing from
creditors;
2. Haircuts: Agreement that creditors will reduce their
total outstanding debt amount to be paid by the debtor;
3. Adequate Assurances & Reform: Promises from the
sovereign-debtor to protect the remaining assets to
ensure creditors are paid back in accordance with the
new restructuring plan, which terms would be agreed
upon as part of the negotiations. Upon adoption of the
plan, the sovereign debtor would not be eligible to obtain
relief or enter negotiations under EDRF for a period of
ten (10) years.
These carrot and stick options are reciprocal arrangements that are
chosen by the parties as part of the negotiations. For example, creditors
providing new financing will be privileged with senior status for
repayment, and creditors willing to accept a haircut can reciprocally
demand adequate assurances—with the option to have the Auditors
oversee compliance. These options are not rules to be drafted into the
terms of the EDRF statutory framework. Instead, the carrot/stick options
are extra tools, which can be used by negotiators in drafting a plan.
New money, debt discounts, and compliance were all options used in
drafting the Statement. However, unlike the prolonged negotiations,
which produced the Statement, the EDRF has a statutory framework to
ensure the efficient administration of the negotiations. In addition, these
rules will also ensure that only those parties necessary to the
restructuring are allowed to participate in negotiations– i.e. the
sovereign-debtor and its creditors.140 Where the Euro Summit invited all
Eurozone leaders to negotiate a solution for Greece and the other
precariously positioned European states, the EDRF would ask the
sovereign-debtor to take the lead. Streamlining the procedure and
restricting participation provides efficiency in the face of a financial
crisis.141 In addition, these measures empower the carrot and stick
139
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options since each party at the table will be impacted by their use or
disuse. Together, the EDRF framework for negotiations and the carrot
and stick options will allow the parties to reach a restructuring plan,
which protects the interests of creditors and ensures the long-term
viability of the sovereign-debtor.
V. TAKING A LEAP TO SAVE THE EURO
Learning from the mistakes of the SDRM and CAC approaches, and
inefficiencies of the Statement, the EDRF can serve as a viable
framework to address future sovereign debt crises. Using the ECA
infrastructure, the professional knowledge of the Auditors, and EFSF
financing maintains European authority over a European issue. Whereas
SDRM invited the involvement of the IMF, here the E.U. can resolve a
member state’s debt crisis using the regional infrastructure that is already
in place.142 Employing a statutory framework would ensure the EDRF
can invoke the participation of all classes of bond holders and all types of
creditors, thereby avoiding the CAC’s aggregation problem.143 Finally,
EDRF reduces the burden imposed on E.U. members by the terms of the
current Statement in two ways. First, the EDRF statutory framework sets
forth guidelines for negotiations. A clear and predictable structure avoids
wasting time and resources developing an ad hoc solution.144 Second,
EDRF helps the relevant parties arrive at a sustainable restructuring plan,
rather than forcing the E.U. member states to fund an expensive and
extensive bailout plan.145 While the EFSF bailout funds and fresh capital
from creditors would be available to incentivize further negotiations,
these funds are part of a package deal, not the only game in town. While
the proposed EDRF structure has many benefits and overcomes the
obstacles faced by prior proposals, there remain potential critics and
criticisms.
First, critics may fear that the availability of a restructuring scheme
will send a negative signal to investors, and potentially, undermine the
European bond market. This is a reasonable concern, but empirical
evidence of the impact is difficult to quantify.146 When CACs were first
proposed, similar concerns were expressed. But those concerns were
can take a long time to reach an agreement and that delays involve costs: while policymakers
negotiate, markets speculate about the probability, nature and depth of a compromise. To rely once
again on improvisation to find a solution would involve significant risks for the stability of the euro
area.”).
142
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proven unnecessary when Mexico introduced the “first New York-law,
SEC-registered bond to include CACs in February 2003 (U.S. $1 billion,
6.625% global notes due 2015).”147 Now, CAC clauses are common
clauses in all bond issuances. In fact, “[i]t is also safe to assume that the
market will question the motivation of any issuer that does not adopt
CACs.”148 Similarly, the inclusion of a bankruptcy clause in a contract,
either consumer or corporate, is a risk which has been assumed in the
price of a contract and contract negotiations.149 Therefore, it seems
reasonable to assume that ERDF will follow the same path as its
predecessors. The change in the legal regime for repayment of sovereign
bonds will initially cause a ripple in the markets, but will likely be
accepted as a measure necessary to ensure greater long-term market
stability.150 In addition, some scholars believe this type of mechanism
will actually strengthen the sovereign bond market:
If anything, this evidence suggests that the introduction
of rules for dealing with sovereign default will
contribute to the tendency of markets to distinguish
between high- and low-quality borrowers and to price
loans and bonds accordingly. This would strengthen
market discipline and contribute to the goal of
sustainable public finances laid down in the European
treaty, and thereby to the sustainability of the euro
itself.151
While the EDRF may potentially spook the bond market in the short
term, it is equally, if not more, likely to support the long-term growth and
sustainability of the euro market. Just as CACs and bankruptcy arose
despite market concerns, the EDRF can provide greater security if
adopted.
Second, like the SDRM, the EDRF would require certain sacrifices of
sovereignty. While this remains a large obstacle, the E.U. and the euro
itself, are products of fiscal policy coordination and subordination to a
centralized institution.152 Therefore E.U. member states, especially the
members that adopted the euro, have already agreed to a “partial loss of
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national sovereignty.”153 In addition, the on-going crisis has reached a
boiling point where desires for fiscal security might further tip the scales
in favor of regional solidarity over nationalistic instincts.154 At each Euro
Summit held in response to the crisis, European policymakers have
reaffirmed their member states’ commitment to the “principle of
solidarity.”155 In October, as part of the Statement, policymakers drafted
the “Ten Measures to Improve the Governance of the Euro Area” (the
Ten Steps). The Ten Steps identified the “need to strengthen economic
policy coordination and surveillance within the euro area.”156 They also
set forth a system allowing for centralized fiscal decision-making and
greater intrusion into member state fiscal policy.157 Then in December,
E.U. leaders moved forward with these Ten Steps by signing an
intergovernmental treaty. The treaty adopted “structural reforms and
fiscal consolidation” in order to enhance E.U. fiscal “monitoring and [to
correct] macroeconomic imbalances.”158 Together, the Ten Steps and the
treaty indicate a willingness of European policymakers to sacrifice
components of fiscal sovereignty as a necessary step towards long-term
fiscal security. On paper and in practice, Europe has moved towards
greater fiscal unity.159 The stability and predictability of an EDRF
framework would follow as the next step on the path towards greater
regional fiscal security and future E.U. economic growth.
Finally, as was the case with SDRM, creditors may worry that EDRF
will create a “moral hazard problem,” whereby debtors will strategically
exercise EDRF to avoid repaying large debts.160 Structurally, EDRF
addresses this concern through the threshold test. Only sovereign-debtors
who meet the threshold requirements, including the “good faith” inquiry,
can obtain relief.161 This test ensures that opportunistic debtors do not
abuse the framework. In addition to the EDRF structural safeguards,
market realities limit the incentive for sovereigns to default. Sovereigns
rely on the issuance of bonds to raise future capital. If sovereigns
actively default or preemptively exercise EDRF, this could potentially
153
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restrict their access to certain types of investor funds.162 Therefore, it is
directly opposed to a sovereign’s fiscal interests to repeatedly or
strategically fail to pay creditors. Together, the threshold requirements
and market-reputational concerns preserve the EDRF as a tool only for
“good faith” sovereign-debtors.
VI. CONCLUSION
The experiment that began with the creation of the supranational
entity, the E.U., and evolved further to the adoption of a uniform
currency, the euro, is on the precipice of disaster. As policymakers draft
new policies to steer the E.U. away from this danger, they have avoided
facing the real problem: reoccurring crises of unsustainable sovereign
debt. Reviving and reforming SDRM to construct a new restructuring
framework, the EDRF, would establish a uniquely European statutory
mechanism for qualifying sovereign-debtors to engage in negotiations
with creditors. Through this supervised, but still deferential framework,
parties can negotiate a restructuring plan tailored to their particular
needs—in general, protecting the financial interests of the creditors and
ensuring the economic stability of the sovereign-nation.
EDRF is a clear solution, which draws on the lessons learned from
prior proposals, SDRM and CACs, and resolves the ad hoc confusion of
the Statement. It also addresses the current debt crisis, and the future
crises that history has proven will likely occur. The precarious condition
of the European economy and the uniquely interconnected nature of the
E.U. put these policymakers in the position to take the leap to allow
sovereign restructuring. Europe defied principals of sovereignty in
agreeing to supranational governance first in the creation of the E.U., and
then in the creation of the euro. Now, Europe must make a swift and
radical action to preserve that Union and the structural integrity of its
political and fiscal institutions. European policymakers should take the
lead in regional solidarity again and pave the way toward sovereign
crisis-response reform with a revised framework for sovereign debt
restructuring: the EDRF.
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